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Sleep deprivation alters decision making; however, it is unclear what specific cognitive
processes are modified to drive altered choices. In this manuscript, we examined
how one night of total sleep deprivation (TSD) alters economic decision making. We
specifically examined changes in uncertainty preferences dissociably from changes in
the strategy with which participants engage with presented choice information. With
high test-retest reliability, we show that TSD does not alter uncertainty preferences
or loss aversion. Rather, TSD alters the information the participants rely upon to
make their choices. Utilizing a choice strategy metric which contrasts the influence
of maximizing and satisficing information on choice behavior, we find that TSD alters
the relative reliance on maximizing information and satisficing information, in the gains
domain. This alteration is the result of participants both decreasing their reliance on
cognitively-complex maximizing information and a concomitant increase in the use
of readily-available satisficing information. TSD did not result in a decrease in overall
information use in either domain. These results show that sleep deprivation alters decision
making by altering the informational strategies that participants employ, without altering
their preferences.
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Introduction
Total sleep deprivation (TSD) has been found to induce cognitive impairments and reduce the
ability to make good decisions and judgments. The effects of TSD on behavior range from
alterations of emotional processing (Yoo et al., 2007; Killgore et al., 2008; Gujar et al., 2011; see
Killgore, 2010 for review), the desirability of food options (Greer et al., 2013), decision making
across multiple domains (Harrison and Horne, 2000), and can even increase the likelihood of
unethical behavior (Barnes et al., 2011). Recent studies indicate that a large percentage of people
regularly suffer from sleep loss globally (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), 2011).
As such, it is important to understand how TSD influences economic decision making.
TSD has been shown to alter economic decision making across various tasks. For
example, sleep-deprived persons have been reported to show an increase in effort discounting
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(Libedinsky et al., 2013), a shift in behavior from preventing
losses to pursuing gains (Venkatraman et al., 2011), a change
in the willingness to take risks on the Balloon Analog Risk
Task (BART) (Acheson et al., 2007; Killgore, 2007), and poorer
performance on the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) (Killgore et al.,
2006). However, it is unclear whether these alterations result
from specific alterations of economic preferences, or from
alterations of other cognitive aspects of the decision-making
process. Accordingly, in this study we sought to specify the effects
of sleep deprivation on economic decision making, focusing on
preferences (uncertainty and loss aversion) and the information
participants utilize to make their decisions (strategy), through a
task that controls for potentially-confounding effects on other
cognitive domains (such as learning).
Our first goal was to investigate whether sleep deprivation
alters uncertainty and loss aversion preferences. Uncertainty
preferences quantify how participants alter the valuation of a
gamble due to an unknown probabilistic outcome. This can
relate to risk (gambles of known probabilities), or ambiguity
(gambles with unknown probabilities) (Knight, 1921; Ellsberg,
1961; Camerer and Weber, 1992). Empirical evidence has shown
that people tend to be risk averse when making decisions about
gains and risk seeking when making decisions about losses
(Prospect Theory, Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Kahneman,
2003). Given such clear behavioral differences between gains and
losses, it is important to dissociably investigate the gains and
losses domains.
The effects of TSD on uncertainty preferences have only been
examined in a small number of experimental studies. Most such
studies have focused on risk preferences in the gains domain
and have found no modulation by TSD (Acheson et al., 2007;
Venkatraman et al., 2007; Menz et al., 2012). Utilizing a task that
involved altering 5-outcome gambles (involving both possible
gains and losses within each trial) Venkatraman et al. (2011)
suggested increased risk-seeking preference under TSD. One
study by McKenna et al. (2007) explored choices to risky and
ambiguity options in both the gains and losses domains, finding
decreased risk aversion in the gains domain and decreased risk
seeking in the losses domain. In this study, we sought to directly
test the effects of TSD on risk preferences (independently in the
gains and losses domains), while separately assessing alterations
of loss aversion or strategy, and avoiding potential confounds
(such as learning effects).
Loss aversion refers to the relative weighting of potential
gains and losses in decision making, with the average person
weighing potential losses approximately twice as strongly as
potential gains (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Tom et al., 2007).
Venkatraman et al. (2011) found neural evidence that TSD
may alter economic choice behavior from “defending against
losses to seeking increased gains,” which would suggest decreased
loss aversion. However, they also specifically tested and found
no alteration in loss aversion within their task. Here, using a
task specifically designed to measure loss aversion (Tom et al.,
2007), we directly test the hypothesis that sleep deprivation
produces a decrease in loss aversion, either by decreasing
the weighting of losses, increasing the weighting of gains, or
both.
The final goal of this study was to investigate whether
TSD alters the strategy with which participants engage with
the available choice information. Our choice strategy metric
quantifies the differential utilization of available information
in decision making by contrasting between a simple satisficing
strategy (the probability of winning the gamble) and a
more cognitively-effortful maximizing strategy (determining
the relative expected value of each of the available options)
(Kurnianingsih et al., 2015; Mullette-Gillman et al., 2015). To
date, no study has investigated the effects of TSD on such strategy
utilization during economic decision-making. We hypothesized
that TSD would result in a decrease in the use of maximizing
information (e.g., calculated expected value information) with
an increase in the use of readily-available satisficing information
(e.g., probability information).
Recent studies have indicated that TSD may result in a
decrease in the ability to process available information, including
reduced visual short termmemory information processing (Chee
and Chuah, 2007), limited selective attention (Lim et al., 2010),
reduced processing of peripheral information (Kong et al., 2012),
and reduced rapid picture processing (Kong et al., 2014). This
presents a secondary hypothesis for us to examine with our
strategy analyses—whether TSD produces an overall decrease in
the use of available information.
In this study, we examined how TSD alters economic
preferences and choice strategy using three incentive-compatible
decision-making tasks: (1) the gains choice task, (2) the losses
choice task, and (3) the loss aversion task. We hypothesized that
TSD would not alter uncertainty or loss aversion preferences, but
would result in alterations of the information participants relied
upon to make their decisions.
Materials and Methods
Subjects
Data were collected from 29 members of the National University
of Singapore community (17 males; age range = 19–26 years,
mean ± SD = 21.66 ± 1.88 years). Participants selected for
this study indicated that they: (1) had good habitual sleep (sleep
duration of 6.5–9 h daily, sleeping before 00:30 and waking
before 09:00), (2) were not of an extreme chronotype (as assessed
by an abbreviated version of the Horne-Öbsterg Morningness-
Eveningness questionnaire; Horne andOstberg, 1976), (3) had no
history of sleep, neurological, or psychiatric disorders, (4) were
non-smokers, and (5) drank fewer than three caffeinated drinks
per day. Additionally, participants’ sleep patterns weremonitored
throughout the duration of the study through the use of wrist
actigraphy (Actiwatch, Philips Respironics, USA); only those who
evidenced good habitual sleep were included. All participants
provided written informed consent in compliance with a protocol
approved by the National University of Singapore Institutional
Review Board, and in accordance with the Declaration of
Helsinki.
Study Procedure
Participants made three visits to the lab, each scheduled 1 week
apart. In the first visit, participants were briefed about the study
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protocol, trained on study tasks, and given a wrist actigraph to be
worn throughout the study.
Participants then completed the rested wakefulness (RW)
and total sleep deprivation (TSD) sessions, with session order
counterbalanced across participants. All participants indicated
that they had not consumed any medication, caffeine, nicotine,
or alcohol for at least 24 h prior to each session.
For the TSD session, participants arrived at the lab at 19:00 the
night before the experiment. Throughout the night, participants
were monitored to ensure they kept awake and engaged
only in sedentary activities. Participants also completed hourly
assessments of vigilance (the 10-min Psychomotor Vigilance
Task, PVT; Dinges et al., 1997).
For the RW session, participants arrived at the lab at 20:30
and were given 9 h of sleep opportunity. Participants performed
one assessment of vigilance and of subjective sleepiness upon
waking up.
In the morning, our economic tasks began at 10:15 for the
RW session, and 7:45 for the TSD session (see Figure 1A);
as such, the effects described here represent the interaction
of circadian and homeostatic factors. As part of a larger
study, participants also completed additional computerized tests,
behavioral questionnaires, and functional magnetic resonance
imaging sessions (not reported here).
All participants completed three tasks in the following order:
gains choice task, losses choice task, loss aversion task. At the
beginning of the preliminary session, participants were informed
that their final monetary payment would be adjusted by $0–$30
based upon the choices that they make. At the end of the entire
experiment, we would randomly select one trial from each of
the three tasks from each main session (6 trials total), resolve
their choices, and pay them an unspecified percentage of the
total funds they accumulated (which was 33%). Importantly,
participants were reminded to treat each trial as the one that
mattered, as it could be the one randomly selected and resolved.
For the loss aversion task, participants were told they were
receiving a $20 endowment (see task description), which was
added to their accumulated funds, and helped ensure that
participants ended up with a positive final accumulation. No
trials were selected, nor gambles resolved, until the conclusion
of the entire experiment to eliminate possible alterations of
preferences and strategies due to learning effects. Participants
were paid in in Singapore dollars.
Experimental Design
Uncertainty Preference Tasks
Uncertainty preference (risk and ambiguity) and choice strategy
were evaluated using our gains choice task and losses choice
task (Stanton et al., 2011; Kurnianingsih et al., 2015; Mullette-
Gillman et al., 2015). Participants performed these two monetary
decision tasks, one featuring choices between possible monetary
gains and the other between possible monetary losses. On
each trial, participants chose between a certain option and a
gamble option with varied value and probability of winning
(Figure 1B). Data collection and analyses were achieved
using MATLAB (Mathworks, Natick, MA) with Psychtoolbox
(www.psychtoolbox.org).
The gains choice task consisted of 165 trials (see full
description in Stanton et al., 2011; Kurnianingsih et al., 2015;
Mullette-Gillman et al., 2015 see full trial metrics in Table S1).
On each trial, the participants chose between a certain monetary
option (such as $3) and a gamble that was either risky or
ambiguous. The 135 risk trials contained a gamble with a known
probability of winning a presented value (such as 50% of $8)
against a fixed alternative of receiving $0. The 30 ambiguity trials
had the same form, except that the gamble had an unknown
probability of winning. Risk and ambiguity trials were intermixed
and randomized across participants. The matrix of presented
risky gambles was constructed from 5 certain gain options {$3,
$4, $5, $6, $7}, three probabilities of winning {25%, 50%, 75%},
A B C
FIGURE 1 | Experimental design. (A) Participants attended 3 sessions, 1 preliminary session followed by 2 main sessions, which were each ∼1 week apart. The
order of the RW and TSD session was counterbalanced across participants. (B) Example trials for the gains choice task and the losses choice task. (C) Example trial
for loss aversion task. For all the monetary decision making tasks, resolution of one trial was given at the end of the experiment to determine participants’ payment.
No outcome resolutions were given during any tasks until completion of the final experimental session.
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and nine different relative expected values (rEV or the ratio of
the expected value of the gamble to the value of the certain
option, EVG/Vc) which were {0.5, 1.0, 1.3, 1.6, 1.9, 2.2, 2.5, 3.0,
3.5}. Potential win values ranged from $2 to $98. For ambiguous
gambles, six rEVs were examined {0.5, 1.0, 2.0, 3.0, 4.0, 6.0}, and
presented gamble values were calculated based on an assumed
50% probability of winning, resulting in values ranging from $3
to $84. For both risky and ambiguous options, a loss would always
result in $0 outcome. Gamble values were rounded to the nearest
10 cents for presentation during choices.
The losses choice task consisted of 200 trials, with 150 risk
trials and 50 ambiguity trials. The losses choice task was based
on the gains choice task, with altered valence and adjusted rEV
values. The adjusted set of 10 rEVs {0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.8, 1.0, 1.3, 1.5,
2.0, 3.0, 4.0} were utilized across both risk and ambiguity trials,
resulting in potential losses ranging from -$0.40 to -$112.
Quantifying Uncertainty Preferences
We quantified uncertainty preferences using psychometric
indifference point analyses to identify the rEV at which the
participant would choose the gamble option 50% of the time, thus
indicating indifference between the certain and gamble options.
Choice functions were constructed by plotting a continuous
function based upon the percentage of accepting the gamble
option (y-axis) to each respective assigned rEV (EVG/Vc).
Examples of choice functions for both domains are shown in
Figure 2. The choice functions were generally monotonic and
the first point where the percentage of accepting the gamble
option crossed 50% was defined to be the indifference point.
We determined the premium value by subtracting 1 from this
indifference point to produce a premium value metric with
zero indicative of risk neutrality. These analyses were conducted
separately for risk and ambiguity and across gains and losses,
resulting in four independent uncertainty premium values for
each participant.
The premium value is a measure of the degree to which
participant alters the valuation of the absolute expected value
of the gamble in relation to outcome uncertainty. As such, a
zero premium value reflects no change in valuation [subjective
value (SV) = expected value (EV)], a positive value indicates
diminished valuation (SV<EV) and a negative value indicates
enhanced valuation (SV>EV). This interpretation of valuation
applies for both gains and losses premium values. However,
in the gains domain, positive/negative premium values indicate
risk aversion/seeking. But in the losses domain negative/positive
premium values indicate risk aversion/seeking. In both domains,
a zero risk premium value indicates risk neutrality.
Our premium metric cannot be derived for participants
whose choice functions do not have an indifference point within
our sampled range (their choice function does not cross 50%
acceptance, see Figure 2). We opted to remove such participants
from uncertainty preference analyses, as such choice functions
are the result of participants notmodulating their choice behavior
across our large set of relative values of the gamble and certain
options (for discussion, see Kurnianingsih et al., 2015). This
resulted in the exclusion of: risk gains: 7 RW and 6 TSD; risk
losses: 1 RW and 1 TSD; ambiguity gains: 11 RWand 10 TSD; and
A
B
FIGURE 2 | Examples choice functions for individual participants. Each
subplot shows the choice behavior for 1 participant across the trials where
they chose between a risky gamble and a certain monetary option one task.
The y-axis indicates the percent at which they selected the gamble option,
across 15 trials for each point. The x-axis is the ratio of the expected value of
the gamble to the value of the certain option (rEV). (A) In the gains choice task,
for 135 risk trials across 9 examined rEV values. (B) In the losses choice task,
for 150 risk trials across 10 examined rEV values. Participants’ choice
functions for the risk trials from each domain-specific task were plotted to
show the percent at which they selected the gamble for each examined rEV
value. The indifference point of each participant was determined as the
projected rEV for where their choice function indicated 50% selection of the
gamble (as indicated with an inverted red triangle for these participants). We
defined the risk premium value for each participant as their indifference point
−1 (to make zero be risk neutral).
ambiguity losses: 1 RW and 1 TSD. We note that the exclusion
rates across RW and TSD sessions are almost identical.
To facilitate comparison across studies, we note that our risk
premium formulation has been previously shown to result in
very high correlations with the power function risk preference
values, when examined in a large sample (N∼300, r >|0.6|for
gains, Stanton et al., 2011) or two moderate samples (N = 62,
r > |0.7| for gains and losses, Kurnianingsih et al., 2015; N =
72, r > |0.49| for gains, and r > |0.77| for losses, Mullette-
Gillman et al., 2015). In the current smaller sample, in RW,
we find slightly lower correlations for risk preferences in gains
[r(20) = −0.41, p = 0.06] and very high correlations in losses
[r(26) = −0.87, p < 0.0001]. For ambiguity preferences, we find
uniformly high correlations [gains, r(16) = −0.81, p < 0.001;
losses, r(26) = −0.90, p < 0.0001], in concurrence with our
prior results (N = 72, r > |0.77| for gains, and r > |0.87|
for losses, Mullette-Gillman et al., 2015). These consistently high
correlations indicate that these two measures of risk preferences
are largely capturing the same variance across participants.
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Quantifying Choice Strategy
Choice strategy refers to the relative use of two conflicting
information types present in each trial that the participant
can rely upon to make their choice—the first is the relative
expected value of the two options (rEV), and the second is the
probability of winning the gamble (pWIN) (see Kurnianingsih
et al., 2015; Mullette-Gillman et al., 2015). While rEV is more
likely to lead to higher average rewards, it requires multiple
steps to calculate. In contrast, while pWIN information is readily
available perceptually, it will lead to lower average rewards.
Importantly, across the risk trials of our task, the pWIN and rEV
of each trial are fully dissociable (their correlation is zero).
To quantify the choice strategy of each participant, for each
domain (gains or losses) we utilized two linear regressions (2
factors × 2 domains) (Kurnianingsih et al., 2015; Mullette-
Gillman et al., 2015). Each of these four linear regressions
determined the influence of one factor (pWIN or rEV) on the
choices of a participant across all risk trials within one domain
(gains or losses). The produced R-squared values provide the
proportion of choice variance that can be explained by each
examined factor (see Figures 4A–D). Therefore, high R-squared
values indicate that choices were most likely influenced by that
trial information (e.g., a participant that determines their choices
solely based on the probability of winning the gamble would have
a high R-squared value for the pWIN factor, while a participant
whose decision is solely based upon the ratio of the expected
value of the gamble to the value of the certain option would have a
high R-squared value for the rEV factor), whereas low R-squared
values indicate that choices were based on other factors or were
made randomly.
We produced the Choice Strategy metric by taking the
difference between these R-squared values (rEV minus pWIN)
for each domain (see Figures 4E–H). As such, the choice strategy
metric directly contrasts utilization of the cognitively demanding
calculation of the relative expected values of the certain and the
gamble option against utilization of the probability of winning
in the gamble option. Choice strategy values are positive when
participants utilize rEV information more and negative when
they utilize pWIN information more. Participants are considered
to be “maximizing” when they have positive choice strategy
(R-squared rEV > R-squared pWIN) and “satisficing” when
they have negative choice strategy (R-squared rEV < R-squared
pWIN).
In addition to determination of the choice strategy metric,
we also utilized the components of these analyses to examine
the question of whether TSD results in an overall decrease
in information use. To test this, we calculated a total strategy
metric for each participant (for each domain and in each state),
as the sum of the R-squared values for the rEV and pWIN
regressions. It is important to note that these trial factors are fully
orthogonal across trials (i.e., the correlation across trials is zero),
so it is mathematically impossible for these factors to account
for the same variability in choice behavior in their independent
regressions.
We note that as our analytic method only examines the
influences of the pWIN and rEV information on the choice
behaviors of each participant, as proxies for satisficing and
maximizing strategies, we are unable to speak to whether sleep
deprivation may have differential effects on the use of other
unexamined informational factors. However, we note specifically
that one additional factor is very highly correlated with the rEV
factor in both tasks—the difference in expected value of the
gamble option and the value of the certain option (EVdiff =
EVg – Vc), Across trials, this factor has an extremely high inter-
trial correlation with the rEV informational factor [gains: r(133) =
0.926, p < 0.0001; losses: r(148) = 0.957, p < 0.0001], and is
almost orthogonal to the pWIN factor [gains: r(133) < 0.0001,
p > 0.99; losses: r(148) < 0.0001, p > 0.99].
Loss Aversion Task
We quantified loss aversion, or the relative influence of potential
losses to potential gains on choice behavior, utilizing a modified
version of the task and analyses of Tom and colleagues (Tom
et al., 2007). The sole alteration in our version was a reduction
in the number of trials, to 64 trials (halving the number of
sampled increments in each domain). In brief, participants were
first endowed with $20 and, on each trial, were given a choice
to keep their endowment or risk part of it on an offered
gamble. Gambles always had a 50% chance of a gain and a
50% chance of a loss, with gains ranging from $12 to $40
in increments of $4, while losses ranged from -$6 to -$20 in
decrements of -$2 (Figure 1C). Participants indicated whether
they accepted each proffered gamble with options of “strongly
accept,” “weakly accept,” “weakly reject,” or “strongly reject.”
No feedback was provided during the task, to prevent learning
effects, and participants were informed in the preliminary session
that their final payment would be based upon random selection
and resolution of one trial from each iteration of the task at the
conclusion of the final session.
Quantifying Loss Aversion
Loss aversion preferences were quantified following the analyses
of Tom et al. (2007). In brief, a logistic regression was fit to the
choices of each participant to determine the differential influence
(beta weights) of the potential loss and gain values of the offered
gambles on choice behavior (accept or reject). The ratio of these
beta weights produced the loss aversion (λ) metric for each
participant. Loss aversion values greater than 1 indicate that an
individual’s choices were more strongly influenced by the value of
the potential losses than the potential gains, while values below 1
indicate the reverse, and values of 1 indicate equal weighting. We
collected data from 21 participants. We excluded 4 participants
whose behavior in either session indicated unreasonable loss
aversion values (such as a lambda of 38). These can be the result
of the participant ignoring the value of the possible gain—such
as employing a fixed response of accepting all gambles whose
loss is below a threshold. Such strategies result in strikingly high
loss aversion values, and are not well captured by the theoretical
concept of loss aversion. This resulted in a final sample of 17
participants for our loss aversion analyses.
Statistical Analyses
All comparisons between TSD and RW conditions are performed
utilizing within-subject statistical tests.
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FIGURE 3 | Uncertainty preferences. Relationship between subjects’ preferences across RW and TSD conditions for (A) Gains risk premium, (B) Losses risk
premium, (C) Gains ambiguity premium, and (D) Losses ambiguity premium.
Results
Relationship of Economic Task Metrics
As a baseline, we examined the inter-relationships of our
economic metrics within the RW state. Risk and ambiguity
premiums were highly correlated within each domain [gains:
r(15) = 0.86, p < 0.0001; losses: r(26) = 0.84, p < 0.0001]. Risk
preferences were uncorrelated with choice strategy within either
domain [gains: r(19) = 0.17, p = 0.46.; losses: r(26) = −0.12,
p = 0.53]. These results concur with our prior results using these
tasks in young adults (Kurnianingsih et al., 2015).
We found no significant correlation (all p > .05, uncorrected)
between loss aversion and uncertainty preferences (risk and
ambiguity) or choice strategies within either domain. As loss
aversion is the ratio of the relative weighting of losses to gains, we
examined for potential relationships between loss aversion and
the ratio of risk premiums and choice strategies across domains
(losses/gains). No significant correlations were found (all p >
0.05, uncorrected), indicating that loss aversion is an independent
measure of choice behavior from risk preferences and choice
strategy.
In summary, we show very high correlations between risk
and ambiguity preferences within a domain, and found no other
significant correlations between our decision-making metrics
within either domain.
Sleep Deprivation Reduces Vigilant Attention
To confirm the robustness of our TSD manipulation, we
examined for alterations of PVT response times and attentional
lapses, as impaired vigilance is among the most robust effects
of sleep deprivation (Lim and Dinges, 2010). PVT data were
available for a subset of 18 participants. On average, participants
showed slower median reaction times in TSD than in RW [mean
± SD, RW: 242.8 ± 22.3ms, TSD: 300.9 ± 50.1ms; t(13) = 6.41,
p < 0.0001, Cohen’s d = 1.54]. There was also an increase in
the number of attentional lapses under TSD [mean ± SD RW:
0.56 ± 0.78; TSD: 7.67 ± 6.74; t(13) = 4.16, p < 0.0001, Cohen’s
d = 1.52].
Sleep Deprivation Does Not Alter the Response
Times of Economic Decisions
Given that TSD alters PVT response times, we examined whether
TSD also alters response times for economic decisions (Table 1).
We found no significant effects of sleep deprivation on response
times within either the gains [mean ± SD risk difference: 0.002
± 0.23; t(28) = 0.06, p = 0.95, Cohen’s d = 0.008; mean ±
SD ambiguity difference: −0.02 ± 0.26; t(28) = 0.48, p = 0.63,
Cohen’s d = 0.07] or the losses domains [rmean ± SD risk
difference:−0.04±0.20; t(28) = 0.97, p = 0.34, Cohen’s d = 0.12;
mean ± SD ambiguity difference: −0.03 ± 0.24; t(28) = 0.62,
p = 0.54, Cohen’s d = 0.10]. Within both states, participants
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A B
C D
E
F
G
H
FIGURE 4 | Choice strategy metric—utilization of trial information. Relationship between trial variances explained (R-squared) by the rEV and pWIN information
for (A) RW gains domain, (B) TSD gains domain, (C) RW losses domain, and (D) TSD losses domain. Distribution of choice strategy values (difference between rEV
R-squared minus pWIN R-squared) for (E) RW gains domain, (F) TSD gains domain, (G) RW losses domain, and (H) TSD losses domain. The “∗” indicates the mean
of each distribution.
exhibited faster response times for the gains choice task than the
losses choice task [risk RW: t(28) = 3.52, p < 0.003, Cohen’s
d = 0.33; TSD: t(28) = 2.16, p < 0.039, Cohen’s d = 0.38;
ambiguity RW: t(28) = 2.50, p = 0.02, Cohen’s d = 0.46; TSD:
t(28) = 1.73, p = 0.09, Cohen’s d = 0.32].
Sleep Deprivation Does Not Alter Risk or
Ambiguity Preferences
To examine the test-retest reliability of our uncertainty
preference metrics, we ran a correlation across sessions. With
∼1 week between sessions, and no resolution of any gambles
until the end of all sessions, we found very strong test-
retest reliability between uncertainty preferences for all four
uncertainty preference measures [correlations; risk gains: r(19) =
0.78, p < 0.0001; risk losses: r(26) = 0.79, p < 0.0001; ambiguity
gains: r(12) = 0.55, p = 0.04; ambiguity losses: r(26) = 0.81,
p < 0.0001].
Sleep deprivation did not shift risk preferences within either
the gains [mean± SD difference: 0.04± 0.47; t(20) < 1, p = 0.73,
Cohen’s d = 0.06] or the losses domains [mean ± SD difference:
−0.04 ± 0.26; t(27) <1, p = 0.40, Cohen’s d = 0.12] (see
Table 1 and Figure 3). Risk preferences under both RW and TSD
followed the classical pattern (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979),
with people generally risk averse for gains and risk neutral or
seeking for losses [mean± SD, Gains RW: 0.48± 0.68, TSD: 0.52
± 0.78; Losses RW: 0.01± 0.43, TSD:−0.03± 0.29].
There was also no significant difference in ambiguity
preferences between RW and TSD within the gains domain
[mean ± SD difference: 0.12 ± 1.38; t(13) < 1, p = 0.76, Cohen’s
d = 0.17]. Within the losses domain, there was a non-significant
trend suggesting higher ambiguity seeking during TSD [mean ±
SD difference: −0.11 ± 0.29; t(27) = 1.90, p = 0.061, Cohen’s
d = 0.24], with calculation of Cohen’s d indicating a small
effect size (Cohen, 1988). Overall, participants were significantly
more ambiguity averse than risk averse in the gains domain [RW:
t(16) = 4.71, p < 0.0001, Cohen’s d = 1.03; TSD: t(17) = 2.92,
p = 0.010, Cohen’s d = 0.69], while no difference between
ambiguity and risk preference was found in the losses domain
[RW: t(27) < 1, p = 0.91, Cohen’s d = 0.01; TSD: t(27) = 1.31,
p = 0.20, Cohen’s d = 0.21].
Sleep Deprivation Does Not Alter Loss Aversion
Preference
We examined the effect of TSD on loss aversion preferences.With
∼1 week separation and no resolution of outcomes, loss aversion
preferences were highly stationary, with test-retest correlations
of [r(15) = 0.95, p < 0.0001]. Examining for modulation of
loss aversion by TSD, we found no significant effect [mean ±
SD difference λ: 0.18 ± 0.70, t(16) = 1.06, p = 0.30, Cohen’s
d = 0.11].
Choice Strategy Is Highly Stationary Over
Sessions
We examined the information that each participant utilized to
make their choices through our choice strategy metric. Across
sessions, with ∼1 week delay and no resolution of outcomes, we
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TABLE 1 | Comparison of economic measures between RW and TSD.
Rested Sleep RW vs. TSD
Wakefulness (RW) Deprivation (TSD) p-value***
mean ± SD mean ± SD
GAINS CHOICE TASK
Uncertainty premiums
Risk (22, 23)* 0.48 ± 0.68 0.52 ± 0.78 0.73
Ambiguity (18, 19) 1.52 ± 1.37 1.28 ± 1.46 0.76
Strategy
Choice strategy (29, 29) −0.007± 0.27 −0.09± 0.30 0.01
rEV r2 (29, 29) 0.19 ± 0.15 0.15 ± 0.14 0.015
pWIN r2 (29, 29) 0.19 ± 0.17 0.23 ± 0.19 0.031
Total strategy (29, 29) 0.38 ± 0.14 0.38 ± 0.15 0.97
Response time (s)**
Risk (29, 29) 1.02 ± 0.31 1.01 ± 0.34 0.95
Ambiguity (29, 29) 1.04 ± 0.35 1.06 ± 0.37 0.63
LOSSES CHOICE TASK
Uncertainty premiums
Risk (28, 28) 0.01 ± 0.43 −0.03± 0.29 0.40
Ambiguity (28, 28) 0.01 ± 0.50 −0.10± 0.38 0.07
Strategy
Choice strategy (29, 29) 0.36 ± 0.15 0.34 ± 0.13 0.32
rEV r2 (29, 29) 0.40 ± 0.12 0.38 ± 0.11 0.40
pWIN r2 (29, 29) 0.04 ± 0.04 0.04 ± 0.05 0.42
Total strategy (29, 29) 0.43 ± 0.10 0.42 ± 0.12 0.57
Response time (s)**
Risk (29, 29) 1.14 ± 0.30 1.10 ± 0.29 0.34
Ambiguity (29, 29) 1.19 ± 0.32 1.16 ± 0.27 0.54
LOSS AVERSION TASK
Loss aversion (17, 17) 1.98 ± 1.40 2.16 ± 1.87 0.30
*Numbers in parentheses indicate the number of subjects in each group (N RW, N TSD).
**Median response time.
***Paired-sample t-tests.
Abbreviations: rEV, Relative Expected Value; pWIN, Probability of Winning; s, seconds.
Bolded values indicate statistical significance at p < 0.05.
found very strong test-retest reliability between choice strategy
values within both domains [correlations; gains: r(27) = 0.84,
p < 0.0001; losses: r(27) = 0.72, p < 0.0001]. This
is a strong concurrence in the test-retest reliability of these
measures, building upon our previously published 90-min delay
(correlations; gains: r > 0.89; losses: r > 0.77; Mullette-Gillman
et al., 2015).
For Gains, Sleep Deprivation Decreases Use of
Maximizing Information and Increases Use of
Satisficing Information
Within the gains domain, we found significant modulation of
choice strategy by sleep deprivation condition [mean ± SD
difference: −0.09 ± 0.16, t(28) = 2.78, p = 0.010 Cohen’s
d = 0.31]. Concurring with our hypotheses, TSD resulted in
decreased choice strategy; that is, diminished use of maximizing
information relative to satisficing information (see Figures 4, 5).
As the choice strategy metric is a composite metric, we examined
the effect of TSD on the independent R-squared values for the two
component factors—rEV and pWIN. Within the gains domain,
TSD resulted in significant alteration of both components—
diminished use of the maximizing rEV information [mean ±
SD difference: −0.04 ± 0.09, t(28) = 2.58, p = 0.015, Cohen’s
d = 0.31] and increased use of the satisficing pWIN information
[mean ± SD difference: 0.05 ± 0.11, t(28) = 2.27, p = 0.031,
Cohen’s d = 0.25].
Given this clear decrease in strategy in the gains domain, we
examined if this change in behavior was related to oft-found
reductions in vigilance. Within the 18 participants with vigilance
data, we found that individual differences in the effects of TSD on
reaction times (PVT RT, TSD-RW) were significantly negatively
correlated with the effects of TSD on choice strategy (TSD-RW)
in the gains domains [r(16) = −0.47, p = 0.047]—individuals
in which TSD led to longer reaction times in the psychomotor
vigilance task also showed reduced choice strategy in the gains
choice task.
For Losses, Sleep Deprivation Does Not Alter
Information Use
Within the losses domain, we did not find a significant mean shift
in choice strategy between RW and TSD [mean ± SD difference:
−0.02± 0.10, t(28) = 1.01, p = 0.32, Cohen’s d = 0.14].
Sleep Deprivation Does Not Alter Total
Information Use
To test whether TSD resulted in a decrease in the total
information that participants used to make their economic
choices, we examined our total strategy metric (the sum of the
R-squared values of the rEV and pWIN regressions). The total
strategy metric showed high within-subject stationarity across
states within both domains [gains, r(27) = 0.72, p < 0.0001;
losses, r(27) = 0.67, p < 0.0001]. Testing for TSD effects, we
found no significant differences between RW and TSD within
either the gains or losses domains [mean ± SD gains difference:
0.005 ± 0.11, t(28) = 0.04, p = 0.81, Cohen’s d = 0.03; losses
difference: −0.01 ± 0.09, t(28) = 0.57, p = 0.57, Cohen’s
d = 0.09).
Replicating Information Use Analyses with
Logistic Regressions
The choice patterns of subjects range from linear to logistic across
the rEV values (as can be seen in Figure 2). Use of linear models
could potentially produce misestimations in participants whose
choice functions are more logistic (specifically, a participant with
a sharp transition will have a lower R-squared value than a
matched participant with a gentle slope). Nonetheless, we chose
to use linear models due to a number of competing items: (1)
answering our hypotheses required two independent regressions
for each participant, to determine the independent contributions
(R-squared values) of the pWIN and rEV trial factors; (2) with
linear models, the cross-trial correlation of zero between the
pWIN and rEV factors prevents omitted-factor bias (i.e., the
misestimation of the contribution of a factor due to the absence
of the second factor in the regression); and (3) with independent
logistic models, omitted-factor bias would be present regardless
of the correlation between the included and excluded factors.
Although our use of linear models is imperfect, the impact on
our principle findings is likely negligible (Hellevik, 2009).
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A B
C D
FIGURE 5 | Choice strategies. Relationship between subjects’ choice strategy across rested wakefulness (RW) and total sleep deprivation (TSD) conditions for
(A) Gains choice strategy, and (B) Losses choice strategy. Distribution of differences in choice strategy (TSD minus RW) for the (C) Gains domain and the (D) Losses
domain. The “∗” indicates the mean of each distribution.
Critically, any such misestimations are independent of the
manipulation that is the focus of this manuscript. In each
condition (RW or TSD), reduced precision of the degree to
which a participant utilized the rEV factor would result in
on-average symmetric noise of the point-estimation (reducing
overall power), but without a directional bias on the examined
manipulation effects (as there is no relationship to the
manipulation). We note that the high individual test-retest
stationarity we reported previously (Section Choice Strategy is
Highly Stationary Over Sessions, with correlations gains r = 0.84
and losses r = 0.72) suggests that the cumulative effects of any
such imprecisions are small. In fact (below), we find the exact
same pattern of manipulation effects using logistic models as was
previously found using linear models.
To test the analytic robustness of our found patterns of
change in information use, we replicated our analyses replacing
the linear regressions with logistic regressions, and calculating
McFadden’s pseudo R-squared (McFadden, 1974).We found very
high correlations between the R-squared and pseudo R-squared
values from the linear and logistic regressions across the RW
and TSD sessions, within both the gains [rEV: r(56) = 0.90,
p < 0.0001; pWIN: r(56) = 0.90, p < 0.0001] and losses [rEV:
r(56) = 0.73, p < 0.0001; pWIN: r(56) = 0.99, p < 0.0001]
domains. We replicated all results contrasting the RW and TSD
sessions—a significant decrease in the use of rEV information
and an increase in pWIN information in the gains domain only
[rEV: gains, t(28) = 2.95, p = 0.006, Cohen’s d = 0.29; losses,
t(28) = 1.45, p = 0.16, Cohen’s d = 0.23; pWIN: gains, t(28) =
2.15, p = 0.041, Cohen’s d = 0.24; losses, t(28) = 0.46, p = 0.65,
Cohen’s d = 0.06], and no alteration of total information used
in either domain [the sum of rEV and pWIN pseudo R-squared
values; gains, t(28) = 0.59, p = 0.56, Cohen’s d = 0.09; losses,
t(28) = 1.36, p = 0.18, Cohen’s d = 0.24].
We note that we could not simply run a multi-factor
regression, as it would provide only a single R-squared value
(accounting for the joint variance accounted for by both
the pWIN and rEV factors) and the estimated coefficients
definitionally address a different dimension of behavior (the
directional influence of the factor, as opposed to the amount of
variance it can explain).
Discussion
We show that sleep deprivation alters economic decision making
through alterations of choice strategies. TSD did not significantly
alter economic preferences (risk, ambiguity, or loss aversion),
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decision response times, or the total information used by
participants. In contrast, we found that one night of sleep
deprivation altered the information that participants relied upon
to make their choices, specifically within the gains domain.
In the gains domain, TSD produced a general decrease in
choice strategy, which was the result of both decreased use of
maximizing information (rEV) and increased use of satisficing
information (pWIN). TSD did not alter the total amount that
participants utilized these types of information, indicating that
in economic decision making TSD produces a switch in what
information participants rely upon rather than a decrease in
overall information use.
TSD Does Not Alter Uncertainty Preferences
Our participants exhibited the standard pattern of average
uncertainty preferences across the gains and losses domains,
during both RW and TSD; that is, participants were, on
average, risk averse for gains and risk seeking/neutral for losses
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). With high test-retest reliability,
we found no alterations in uncertainty preferences in either the
gains or the losses domains. This represents the first study to
explicitly test sleep deprivation effects on uncertainty preferences
while controlling for potentially confounding factors such as
strategy and learning.
We note that, as compared to our findings, several prior
studies have suggested that TSD results in altered uncertainty
preferences. This discrepancy may be due to task and metric
differences, with previous studies unable to dissociate alterations
in uncertainty preferences from related cognitive processes such
as reward learning (as in the Iowa Gambling Task, Killgore
et al., 2006). Beyond explicitly testing uncertainty preferences,
our task design also allowed us to distinguish alterations of
preferences from alterations of strategies. We suggest that this
conflict can be resolved through consideration of our observed
alterations of choice strategies (see below). That is, prior studies
may have ascribed behavioral alterations to preference shifts that
may actually have been due to changes in choice strategy.
TSD Does Not Alter Loss Aversion Preferences
We also examined whether TSD results in a change in loss
aversion, or the relative weighting of losses and gains. We
found no alteration of loss aversion preferences, concurring with
the behavioral findings of Venkatraman et al. (2011) and their
suggestion that behavioral alterations are due to other factors.
TSD Decreases Choice Strategy in the Gains
Domain
Within the gains domain, TSD resulted in a significant decrease
in our choice strategy metric. As this is a compound metric, we
examined the components and found that TSD both decreased
the use of the relative expected value information (rEV) and
increased the use of probability information (pWIN). Use of
the rEV may be considered a form of “maximizing strategy”
(maximizes expected outcomes, but requires multiple cognitive
steps to calculate), while use of pWIN may be considered
a “satisficing strategy” (a simplifying heuristic that utilizes
readily-available information at the cost of maximizing rewards).
As such, in the gains domain TSD led to decreased use
of maximizing strategies and concomitant increased use of
satisficing strategies. This result concurs with a recent study by
Menz et al. (2012), which found a reduction in decision-making
quality (higher stochasticity) without a change in preferences.
Further, the individual change (TSD-RW) in choice strategy
in the gains domain showed a negative correlation with change
in performance on the psychomotor vigilance task. Given
the inversion between these scales, with poorer performance
corresponding to higher PVT response times and lower choice
strategy values, this relationship shows that the individuals
who had the most detrimental effect of TSD modulation on
PVT also had the greatest reduction in maximizing behavior.
This relationship suggests that the mechanisms through which
sleep deprivation alters choice strategy in the gains domain
is related to the mechanisms for altered response times in
the PVT.
Inferring Cognitive Alterations
Does this pattern of alterations allow us to determine what
cognitive processes are affected by sleep deprivation? TSD
specifically altered strategy in the gains domain, with decreased
use of maximizing information and increased use of satisficing
information. Notably, there was a correlation between the degree
of change (TSD-RW) in choice strategy and the change in
psychomotor vigilance. However, TSD did not alter uncertainty
preferences (risk or ambiguity) or loss aversion. These results
clearly show the independence of effects in the gains and losses
domains, suggesting that the cognitive or neural mechanisms are
not simple mirrors. In addition, the domain-specificity of our
alteration suggests a possible alternate explanation for the TSD-
produced optimism bias found by Venkatraman et al. (2011). In
brief, a gains-specific increase in satisficing behavior could have
biased behavior in their 5-outcome mixed gamble task (rather
than a change in valuation).
Are these results interpretable through a simple two-system
model of affect vs. reason? If TSD specifically alters affective
processes, such as the subjective valuation of gains or losses, then
we may have seen clear changes in risk preferences in either
domain. If TSD alters the relative valuation of gains and losses,
then we may have seen clear changes in loss aversion. We saw
neither of these.
Rather, the effects of TSD were limited to the strategy
measures. Based on a dual-system model, this pattern of changed
strategy with unaltered preferences could be interpreted to
suggest that TSD alters cognitive processes related to reason
without altering affect. However, in disagreement, we also found
no reduction in overall information use, and the changes in
strategy were limited to the gains domain.
We caution against interpreting these results based upon such
a dual-system approach. Simply, changes in strategy could be the
result of changes in reason or motivation. Similarly, changes in
risk preferences or loss aversion could not only be produced by
altered affect, but could also be derived from changes in reasoning
alone.
The clearest indication of the altered cognitive processes
responsible for our found alteration in gains strategy come
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from the strong relationship between the change in strategy and
the change in psychomotor vigilance (PVT). This relationship
suggests that these effects share an underlying source, but
unfortunately our results cannot specify that source.
Conclusions
TSD alters the information participants rely upon to make their
decisions, without modulating uncertainty preferences (risk and
ambiguity), loss aversion, or decision time. In gains, we identified
a decrease in use of maximizing information with a concomitant
increase in the use of satisficing information. TSD did not
decrease the overall information use.
These results clearly indicate that sleep deprivation negatively
impacts decision making in the gains domains, which will lead to
lost gains. Such specification of the effects of sleep deprivation on
human decision making is critical for the production of effective
treatments and policy, including interventions and training for
individuals who face unavoidable sleep deprivation (e.g., due to
career, medical conditions, or parenting).
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